



THE GRAINGER COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
SIEBEL SCHOOL OF COMPUTING AND DATA SCIENCE

CS 521

Technological Foundations of Blockchain and Cryptocurrency

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Topic 4 – Zero Knowledge Proofs




Thanks

- Justin Thaler
 - His book: <https://people.cs.georgetown.edu/jthaler/ProofsArgsAndZK.html>

Interactive Proof

Checking that something you do not have direct access to is true/correct



Proving Color Challenge

Given two objects,  and , which **Verifier** owns but cannot distinguish

Goal: **Prover** to convince **Verifier** that it knows that  \neq 

Reed-Solomon Fingerprinting

Goal: **Prover** to convince **Verifier** that it knows (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) , where $a_i \in F$.

Naïve solution: **Prover** sends a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n (expensive, violates privacy, etc)

Good solution:

Verifier sends **Prover** random element $r \in F$

Prover sends **Verifier** $h = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i \cdot r^{i-1}$

Verifier checks received h against its locally computed $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i \cdot r^{i-1}$

Reed-Solomon Fingerprinting

The randomly chosen $r \in F$ needs to be a solution of $p_a(x) - p_b(x) = 0$, where

$$p_a(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i \cdot x^{i-1} \qquad p_b(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n b_i \cdot x^{i-1}$$

But there are at most n solutions, so probability of r to be solution very small

Freivald's Algorithm

Verifier has two $n * n$ matrices, A and B , with elements in field F_p .

Goal: Prover to convince **Verifier** that it knows C such that $C = A * B$

Naïve solution: **Prover** sends C to **Verifier**. Verifier computes $A * B$ and checks if it is equal to C or not. This is expensive (n^3), violates privacy, etc.

Good solution:

Verifier sends **Prover** random element $r \in F_p^n$

Prover sends **Verifier** $h = C * r$

Verifier checks received h against its locally computed $A * (B * r)$

Schnorr: proving knowledge of logarithm

Common Input: the description of a prime-order group \mathbb{G} of (exponentially large) order p with a generator g , and a group element h .

Prover Witness: A value $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $g^x = h$.

Protocol:

1. \mathcal{P} : pick $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, send $\rho \leftarrow g^r$.
2. \mathcal{V} : pick $e \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, send e .
3. \mathcal{P} : send $d \leftarrow e \cdot x + r \pmod{p}$

Verification: \mathcal{V} accepts iff $g^d = h^e \rho$.

The Sum-Check Protocol

Given a v -variate polynomial g over a finite field F .

Goal: **Prover** to provide **Verifier** with the following sum:

$$H := \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{b_v \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, \dots, b_v)$$

Naïve solution: **Verifier** can compute H in $2^v * \text{eval}(g)$

- Considered unacceptable, suppose $\text{eval}(g)$ is very expensive

Good solution: $O(v + \text{eval}(g))$ for **Verifier**; $O(2^v)$ for **Prover**

Round 1

Prover claims C_1 to Verifier as value of H and sends $g_1(X_1)$ claimed to equal

$$\sum_{(x_2, \dots, x_v) \in \{0, 1\}^{v-1}} g(X_1, x_2, \dots, x_v)$$

Verifier checks $C_1 = g_1(0) + g_1(1)$

Verifier sends random element $r_1 \in F$ to Prover

Round j ($1 < j < v$)

Prover sends **Verifier** $g_j(X_j)$ claimed to equal

$$\sum_{(x_{j+1}, \dots, x_v) \in \{0,1\}^{v-j}} g(r_1, \dots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \dots, x_v)$$

Verifier checks $g_{j-1}(r_{j-1}) = g_j(0) + g_j(1)$

Verifier sends random element $r_j \in F$ to **Prover**

Round v

Prover sends **Verifier** $g_v(X_v)$ claimed to equal

$$g(r_1, \dots, r_{v-1}, X_v)$$

Verifier checks $g_{v-1}(r_{v-1}) = g_v(0) + g_v(1)$

Verifier chooses random element $r_v \in F$ and checks $g_v(r_v) = g(r_1, \dots, r_v)$

Verifier evaluated g , which was assumed expensive, only once!