

Overview and Tutorial of **Real-Time Maude**

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Outline

- **Overview:**
 - High-level overview
 - Applications
 - Summary of experiences
- **Tutorial:**
 - Specification formalism and analysis commands
 - A very simple **clock example**
 - **Objects** and **messages**
 - * simple **thermostat** example
 - Fragments of **CASH** scheduling algorithm

Overview

Real-Time Maude Overview I

Real-Time Maude: a “light-weight” extension of **Maude**

- **Specification:**
 - like Maude (equations, rewrite rules) + **tick rewrite rule(s)** for advancing time
 - useful specification techniques for **object-oriented** real-time systems

Real-Time Maude Overview II

- Light-weight extension of Maude's **analysis** commands
 - execution strategies for tick rules for **dense time**
 - **timed rewriting** for simulation/prototyping
 - **time bounded** and unbounded explicit-state **reachability analysis (search)** and LTL **model checking**
 - * can apply **time bounded** model checking to infinite-state systems
- **Completeness of analysis?**
 - analyze all behaviors for **dense time**?
 - **Real-Time Maude** much more expressive than timed automata, etc.
 - still: complete analysis for useful classes of OO systems

Real-Time Overview III

Inherits from Maude:

- **Expressiveness**
 - model many different kinds of systems
 - model large systems with different “features”
- Simple and **intuitive formalism** (equations and rules)
 - intuitive semantics
- Natural specification style for **object-based** real-time systems
- Range of analysis features (simulation, reachability analysis, model checking, ...)
- High performance

Some Applications I: Comm. Protocols

1. **AER/NCA** active networks protocol suite for reliable, scalable, adaptive **multicast**
 - large protocol suite
 - found all “known” errors (not told to us)
 - found significant errors **not** found by traditional testing by the protocol developers
2. (Parts of) **NORM** multicast protocol developed by **IETF**

Some Applications II: Scheduling Algorithms

Variation of **CASH** scheduling algorithm (with M. Caccamo)

- **CASH queue** of unused execution budgets
- **simulation**: queue can grow beyond any bound
 - beyond the scope of **finite-control formalisms** and standard **decision procedures** for real-time systems
- specified “all possible task sets” for given set of servers
- **search** found that extension could **not** guarantee schedulability
 - no ingenuity in def of **initial states**
 - “Monte Carlo simulation” showed that it was “unlikely” that overflow could be found by simulation

Some Applications III: OGDC algorithm for WSNs

OGDC coverage algorithm for **wireless sensor networks** (WSNs)

- developed by Jennifer Hou and Honghai Zhang
 - simulated in **ns-2** with **wireless extension** by Hou & Zhang
- WSN **challenging** domain (in OGDC):
 - new forms of **communication** (radio: broadcast to nodes **within transmission range**; with delay)
 - model **areas**, angles, . . .
 - probabilistic behaviors
 - analyze **performance** (and correctness)
- need expressive formalism

Some Applications III: OGDC algorithms for WSNs (cont.)

Formally specified, simulated, and model checked OGDC

- communication model w/ delay
- **simulation** using timed rewriting:
 - **400 nodes** in **one round**
 - **75 nodes** in **50 rounds**
- measured Zhang & Hou performance metrics **during** simulation
 - **number of active nodes** and **% coverage** at end of first round
 - **% coverage** + **total power** throughout network lifetime
- slightly **different results** from Z&H
 - **could** be because of **transmission delays**
- took Univ. Oslo student **4 months** total

Some Applications III: OGDC algorithms for WSNs (cont.)

- **Model checking**
 - only up to **6 nodes**
- **TTBOMK** first formal model and analysis of “advanced” WSN algorithm
- Initial efforts using **Real-Time Maude** for WSN at **Air Force Labs** and **UC Irvine/SRI**

Time-Sensitive Cryptographic Protocols

- **Non-Zeno** intruder
 - time-bounded analysis terminates
 - strategy where **time bound** and **intruder capability increased gradually** after “unsuccessful” search/model checking
- **Wide-mouthed frog** and **Kerberos**
- found easily known flaws in **WMF** (search)
- and almost all in **Kerberos**

Summary I

- + Expressiveness/Generality
 - diverse class of (large) state-of-the-art systems
 - different **communication forms** (links, area broadcast) at **different levels of abstraction**
- + Intuitive formalism for **OO** RTS (AER/NCA)
- + Spec techniques + high level of abstraction:
 - models quickly developed
- + **Simulation** useful for large systems
- + Expressive “queries”
 - LTL formulas with parameterized atomic propositions
- + Inherits Maude’s **high performance**

Summary II

- **Explicit-state** search and model checking
 - memory (and time) easily exhausted
 - **often** model check only small systems/states/durations
- But** found “overflow” in CASH in minutes using search
 - Only 6 nodes for OGDC
 - but** no other formal tool can even specify OGDC (?)
- But** found WMF attack **faster** than only other model checking effort I know
 - Problems often found for small states (NSPK, RBP, . . .)
 - Difficult for large **and** highly nondeterministic systems
 - RTS sometimes more deterministic than untimed systems

Summary III

Real-Time Maude does not “**verify**” a system

- analysis from **single** initial states and up to a given **duration**
- **could** use **inductive techniques** (theorem proving) via Maude’s ITP
- **narrowing**: reachability analysis from (potentially) infinite number of initial states
- . . .
- tool’s reflective capabilities allows it to be extended with analysis strategies/techniques

Tutorial

Specification Formalism

- Specification formalism:
 - algebraic **equational specification** for data types/functional aspects
 - **rewrite rules** define **instantaneous** transitions
 - **time elapse** modeled by **tick rewrite rules**
 $\{t\} \Rightarrow \{t'\}$ in time τ if *cond*
- Specification techniques for **object-based** specification
 - system state: **multiset** of objects
 - rewrite rules on subconfigurations

Example: A Retrograde Clock

Clock which shows the time:

- global state $\{\text{clock}(r)\}$
- **dense** time domain
- clock **can stop** at any time due to battery failure
- **retrograde** clock: $\text{clock}(24)$ should be reset to $\text{clock}(0)$

Example: Retrograde Clock

```
(tmod DENSE-CLOCK is pr POSRAT-TIME-DOMAIN .
ops clock stopped-clock : Time -> System .
vars R R' : Time .
cr1 [tickWhenRunning] :
  {clock(R)} => {clock(R + R')} in time R'
  if R' <= 24 - R [nonexec] .
r1 [tickWhenStopped] :
  {stopped-clock(R)} => {stopped-clock(R)}
  in time R' [nonexec] .
r1 [reset] : clock(24) => clock(0) .
r1 [batteryDies] :
  clock(R) => stopped-clock(R) .
endtm)
```

Time Sampling Strategies

- Tick rules “cover” the dense time domain
- ... but are not executable
- Choice of **time sampling strategies** to treat such rules, including
 - advance time by time Δ
 - advance time as much as possible
- Time sampling often sufficient **in practice**
 - usually **discrete** time domain in communication, scheduling, etc.
 - things happen because timers expire, messages are read, etc.
- **Maximal** time sampling sound and complete for useful class of systems

Example: Setting a Time Sampling Strategy

Set time to advance by 1 in each tick rule application:

```
Maude> (set tick def 1 .)
```

- all subsequent **Real-Time Maude** analysis performed w.r.t. this strategy

Formal Analysis I: Symbolic Simulation

Timed rewriting simulates **one** possible behavior:

```
Maude> (trew {clock(0)} in time <= 100 .)
```

Result ClockedSystem :

```
{stopped-clock(24)} in time 100
```

- can **trace** the rewrite steps

Formal Analysis II: Search and Model Checking

- To analyze **all** behaviors, **relative to the chosen time sampling strategy**, from initial state
 - **search** for reachable states matching a given pattern
 - linear **temporal logic model checking**
- Reachable state space often **infinite** in larger systems:
 - search/model check **up to a given duration**
 - reachable state space then becomes **finite** (most often)
- When reachable state space **finite**: **unbounded** search/model checking
- No guarantee that all “interesting” behaviors covered
 - false positives possible
 - a counterexample is a **valid** counterexample

Example: Search

- Can $\{\text{clock}(25)\}$ be reached from $\{\text{clock}(0)\}$ within time 100?

```
(tsearch [1] {clock(0)} =>* {clock(25)}  
in time <= 100 .)
```

- Finite reachable state space: unbounded search:

```
(utsearch [1] {clock(0)} =>* {clock(25)} .)
```

- State $\{\text{clock}(1/2)\}$ not found because of time sampling:

```
(utsearch [1] {clock(0)} =>* {clock(1/2)} .)
```

- Deadlock possible?

```
(utsearch [1] {clock(0)} =>! {S:System} .)
```

Temporal Logic Model Checking

- Propositional linear temporal logic
- **Not metric** temporal logic
 - propositions may involve elapsed time (“**clocked** properties”)
- Time bound \Rightarrow termination of model checking
- Provides counterexamples
- Uses **Maude**’s high-performance model checker
- Formula:
 - user-defined atomic propositions
 - temporal logic operators such as $\sim, \setminus, [], \langle \rangle, U$

Example: Defining Propositions

- **clock-dead**: holds if clock has stopped

```
op clock-dead : -> Prop [ctor] .
vars R R' : Time .
eq {stopped-clock(R)} |= clock-dead = true .
```
- **clock-is(*r*)**: **running** clock shows *r*

```
op clock-is : Time -> Prop [ctor] .
eq {clock(R)} |= clock-is(R') = (R == R') .
```
- **clockEqualsTime**: **running** clock shows the current time elapse

```
op clockEqualsTime : -> Prop [ctor] .
eq {clock(R)} in time R' |= clockEqualsTime
= (R == R') .
```

Example: Temporal Logic Model Checking

- The clock is never 25:

```
(mc {clock(0)} |=u [] ~ clock-is(25) .)
```
- Clock shows elapsed time until time 24 or until it dies:

```
(mc {clock(0)} |=t clockEqualsTime U
      (clock-is(24) \ / clock-dead)
  in time <= 100 .)
```
- Counter-example: clock value 4 not always reached:

```
(mc {clock(0)} |=u <> clock-is(4) .)
```

Classes and Objects

Class declaration:

```
class C | att1 : s1, ..., attn : sn .
```

A object instance *O* of class *C* is a term

```
< O : C | att1 : val1, ..., attn : valn >
```

Example:

```
class Thermostat | currTemp : PosRat, heater : OnOff,
                  desiredTemp : Nat .
```

An object might be

```
< "Kitchen" : Thermostat | currTemp : 74, heater : on,
                             desiredTemp : 72 >
```

More Objects

An **instantaneous** rewrite rule could be

```
var O : Oid . vars M N : Nat .

crl [turnOffHeater] :
  < O : ThermoStat | currTemp : M, heater : on,
    desiredTemp : N >
=>
  < O : ThermoStat | heater : off >
  if M >= N + 6 .
```

Messages

A **message** can be seen as a term of sort `Msg`:

```
msg setDesTemp : Oid Nat -> Msg .
```

A concrete message is then

```
setDesTemp("LivingRoom", 66)
```

For transmission delays:

```
dly(setDesTemp("LivingRoom", 66), 5)
```

will be "ready" in time 5

Configurations

The whole state: a **multiset** of **objects** and (delayed and ripe) **messages**:

```
{< "Kitchen" : ThermoStat | currTemp : 74, heater : on,
  desiredTemp : 72 >
< "BedRoom" : ThermoStat | currTemp : 68, heater : off,
  desiredTemp : 66 >
< "Bathroom" : ThermoStat | currTemp : 73, heater : off,
  desiredTemp : 78 >
dly(setDesTemp("BedRoom", 64), 2)
setDesTemp("Bathroom", 80)}
```

Rules

- **Multiset (AC) rewriting** supported directly in Maude
- Rewrite subconfigurations

Rule:

```
rl [readNewDesTemp] :
  setDesTemp(O, N)
  < O : ThermoStat | >
=>
  < O : ThermoStat | desiredTemp : N > .
```

Must also have rule where some User generates messages

OO and Time

Usually only **one** tick rule

```
var C : Configuration .   var T : Time .  
  
crl {C} => {delta(C, T)} in time T if T <= mte(C) .
```

- nondeterministic time advance
- delta defines time advance on a configuration
- mte: how much time can advance before something **must** happen?
- delta and mte distribute over elements and must be defined for single objects:

```
eq delta(< O : ThermoStat | currTemp : N,  
        heater : on >, T) =  
    < O : ThermoStat | currTemp : N + 2 * T > .
```

```
eq delta(< O : ThermoStat | currTemp : N,  
        heater : off >, T) =  
    < O : ThermoStat | currTemp : N - T > .
```

```
eq mte(< O : ThermoStat | currTemp : M, heater : on,  
      desiredTemp : N >) =  
    ((N + 6) monus M) / 2 .
```

```
eq mte(< O : ThermoStat | currTemp : M, heater : off,  
      desiredTemp : N >) =  
    M monus (N - 6) .
```

Modeling CASH in Real-Time Maude (I)

Two models of CASH:

- modeling **all possible** task sets
 - a job can arrive at any time, and can execute for any time (> 0)
 - can analyze all possible behaviors for a **given set of servers**
- “randomly” generated jobs
 - for “Monte-Carlo” simulations

Modeling CASH in Real-Time Maude (II)

- Data types for the CASH queue, etc
- Object-based specification; the task server class **Server**:

```
class Server |  
    maxBudget      : NzTime,  
    period         : NzTime,  
    state          : ServerState,  
    usedOfBudget   : Time,  
    timeToDeadline : Time,  
    timeExecuted   : Time .  
  
sort ServerState .  
ops idle waiting executing : -> ServerState [ctor] .
```

- Dynamic behavior modeled by 10 rewrite rules

Modeling CASH in Real-Time Maude (III)

Dynamic behavior: job arrives at server S_i while server S_j is executing:

```
rl [idleToActive] :
  < Si : Server | period : Ti, state : idle,
                    timeToDeadline : T >
  < Sj : Server | state : executing, timeToDeadline : T' >
=>
  if (T + Ti) < T' then --- preempt Sj
    (< Si : Server | state : executing, timeExecuted : 0,
      timeToDeadline : T + Ti >
     < Sj : Server | state : waiting >)
  else --- wait for processor
    (< Si : Server | state : waiting, timeExecuted : 0,
      timeToDeadline : T + Ti >
     < Sj : Server | >)
  fi .
```

Modeling CASH in Real-Time Maude (IV)

Remaining budget larger than relative deadline:

```
op DEADLINE-MISS : -> Configuration [ctor] .

crl [deadlineMiss] :
  < Si : Server | state : STATE, usedOfBudget : T,
                    timeToDeadline : T',
                    maxBudget : Qi >
=>
  DEADLINE-MISS
  if (Qi - T) > T'
    /\ STATE == waiting or STATE == executing .
```

Analyzing CASH in Real-Time Maude (I)

Initial state (which should **not** lead to missed deadline):

```
op init2 : -> GlobalSystem .
eq init2 =
  {< s1 : Server | maxBudget : 2, period : 5,
                    timeExecuted : 0, usedOfBudget : 0,
                    state : idle, timeToDeadline : 0 >
   < s2 : Server | maxBudget : 4, period : 7, ... >
   [CASH: emptyQueue]
   AVAILABLE-PROCESSOR} .
```

Analyzing CASH in Real-Time Maude (III)

Time-bounded **reachability analysis**

- search for state containing **DEADLINE-MISS**:

```
Maude> (tsearch [1] init2 =>*
        {DEADLINE-MISS C:Configuration} in time <= 12 .)
```

Solution 1

```
C:Configuration <- ... ; TIME_ELAPSED:Time <- 12
```

- hard tasks **cannot** be guaranteed!
- search took 140 sec.
- no ingenuity in choice of initial state

Example: Ventilation Machine

Ventilation Machine Example

- Short **email** from Lui Sha
 - many assumptions need clarification
- Problem:
 - ventilation machine must stop when Xray taken
 - but not too often or too long
 - components may break down ...
 - ... but patient should survive!
- Nondeterministic message delay
- “all clocks synchronized within 10 msec” (?)

Formal Model

- Modulo my current understanding ...
- Large time scale (600 000) and nondeterministic delays
 - new efficient communication model (nondet message delay + maximal time sampling)
- OO solution
 - slight overkill
 - intuitive
 - specification techniques useful
 - does not add more states
- Failure not yet added!

Controller

```
class Controller | clock : Time, lastPauseTime : Time .

rl [readPushButtonMsg] :
  pushButton
  < C : Controller | clock : T, lastPauseTime : T' >
  =>
  if not tooEarly(T, T') then --- take X-ray
    (< C : Controller | lastPauseTime : T + 3000 >
     dly(to VentMachine pause 2sec in 1sec, MIN-DELAY, 50)
     dly(to X-ray takeXray in 2sec, MIN-DELAY, 50))
  else --- too early!
    (< C : Controller | >
     dly(userWaitUntil (T' + 600000 + 10), 0, 50))
  fi .
```

Controller: Timed Behavior

```
eq delta(< C : Controller | clock : T >, T') =
  < C : Controller | clock : T + T' > .

eq mte(< C : Controller | clock : T >) = INF .
```

Ventilation Machine Class

```
class VentMachine | state : BreathingState .

sort BreathingState .

op breathing : -> BreathingState [ctor] .
ops breatheUntil stopBreathing :
  Time -> BreathingState [ctor] .
```

The latter two are “timers”

Ventilation Machine Rules

Stop request received after delay:

- should **pause for two seconds** after one second:

```
--- Read message from Controller:
rl [VMreadPause] :
  (to VentMachine pause 2sec in 1sec)
  < V : VentMachine | >
=>
  < V : VentMachine | state : breatheUntil(1000) > .

--- Wait timer expired:
rl [stopBreathing] :
  < V : VentMachine | state : breatheUntil(0) >
=>
  < V : VentMachine | state : stopBreathing(2000) > .
```

--- start to breathe again:

```
rl [restartBreathing] :
  < V : VentMachine | state : stopBreathing(0) >
=>
  < V : VentMachine | state : breathing > .
```

VM Time Behavior

- “Timers” decreased with elapse of time
- Time advance must stop when a timer can reach 0

```
eq delta(< V : VentMachine | state : breathing >, T) =
  < V : VentMachine | state : breathing > .
eq mte(< V : VentMachine | state : breathing >) = INF .

eq delta(< V : VentMachine | state : breatheUntil(T) >, T') =
  < V : VentMachine | state : breatheUntil(T minus T') > .
eq mte(< V : VentMachine | state : breatheUntil(T) >) = T .

eq delta(< V : VentMachine | state : stopBreathing(T) >, T') =
  < V : VentMachine | state : stopBreathing(T minus T') > .
eq mte(< V : VentMachine | state : stopBreathing(T) >) = T .
```

X-ray Class

```
class X-ray | state : XRstate .

sort XRstate .
ops idle takingXray : -> XRstate [ctor] .
op wait : Time -> XRstate [ctor] .
```

Rules for X-ray Machine

Get message; wait for two seconds; then take (instantaneous?) X-ray:

```
--- Getting message:
rl [XrayReadMsg] :
  (to X-ray takeXray in 2sec)
  < X : X-ray | >
=>
  < X : X-ray | state : wait(2000) > .
--- This request overrides previous requests ... correct?

--- Take X-ray:
rl [takeXray] :
  < X : X-ray | state : wait(0) >
=>
  < X : X-ray | state : takingXray > .
```

```
--- Afterwards, the system should immediately idle:
rl [idle] :
  < X : X-ray | state : takingXray >
=>
  < X : X-ray | state : idle > .
```

Behavior in time is trivial

User

For execution environment, add a **user**

- push button every X time units (e.g., every minute)
- read **wait**-messages:

```
class User | pushButtonTimer : TimeInf,  
           pushInterval : Time .  
  
rl [pushButton] :  
  < U : User | pushButtonTimer : 0, pushInterval : T >  
=>  
  < U : User | pushButtonTimer : T >  
  dly(pushButton, MIN-DELAY, 50) .  
  
rl [readUserWait] :  
  (userWaitUntil T) < U : User | > => < U : User | >
```

Initial State and Time Sampling Strategy

Initial state:

```
op initState : -> GlobalSystem .  
eq initState =  
  {< u : User | pushButtonTimer : 0,  
    pushInterval : 60000 >  
   < ct : Controller | clock : 0, lastPauseTime : 0 >  
   < vm : VentMachine | state : breathing >  
   < xr : X-ray | state : idle >} .
```

For execution: maximal time sampling:

```
(set tick max def 1000 .)
```

Analysis I

Safety: machine **not** breathing when X-ray taken!

- search for state violating property:

```
(tsearch [1] initState =>*  
  {C:Configuration  
   < xr : X-ray | state : takingXray >  
   < vm : VentMachine | state : breathing >}  
  in time <= 70000 .)  
  
(tsearch [1] initState =>*  
  {C:Configuration  
   < xr : X-ray | state : takingXray >  
   < vm : VentMachine | state : breatheUntil(NZT:NzTime) >}  
  in time <= 700000 .)
```

No such state found (in 2 resp 3 seconds!)

Analysis II

Usability: After first push of button (at time 0), an X-ray must be taken within 3 seconds:

```
(find latest initState =>*  
  {C:Configuration  
   < xr : X-ray | state : takingXray >}  
  with no time limit .)
```

Result: {...} in time 2100

An X-ray will **always** be taken within time 2100.

Analysis III

Safety:

- ventilation not paused for longer than **2 seconds**
- not more than **one pause** within 10 minutes

Not yet done!

- Not expressible in non-metric TL in our spec
- Must store history in VM
 - add extra “mythical attributes” **pauseTime** and **timeSinceLastPause** and update them according to “correct” time elapsed
 - then, analysis trivial: search for bad breaches